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Abstract:  
When Cubitt, Munro and Starmer (2004) presented their new experimental 
investigation of preference reversal, they pointed out that their test results cannot be 
explained by any of the best-known explanations proposed by economists and 
psychologists. In this paper we propose a model based on lotteries qualities to 
explain these new test results. 
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Introduction 
 
When Cubitt, Munro and Starmer (CMS) (2004) presented their new experimental 
investigation of preference reversal, they pointed out that their test results cannot be 
explained by any of the best-known explanations proposed by economists and 
psychologists. In this paper we propose a model based on lotteries qualities to 
explain these new test results. CMS tests use pairs of simple monetary gambles. In 
each pair one bet (the P-bet) offers a relatively large chance of a modest prize, 
while the other (the $-bet) offers a smaller chance of a larger prize. The subjects 
make a straight choice between the P-bet and the $-bet. They also state a monetary 
valuation for each bet. A standard preference reversal (SPR) occurs when subjects 
choose the P-bet over the $-bet in the choice task but place a higher monetary value 
on the $-bet. A counter preference reversal (CPR) occurs when subjects choose the 
$-bet over the P-bet in the choice task but place a higher monetary value on the P-
bet. The subjects are faced with three different tasks. Table 1 presents an example. 
Table 1 
Choice and Valuation Tasks 
Choice task 
Choose A or B: 
                      Option A:     You get L32.00 for numbers 1 to 31 
                      Option B:     You get L8.00 for numbers 1 to 97 
Money Valuation Task (MV) 
Set the missing amount so that the two options are equally attractive: 
                      Option A:     You get L??? for numbers 1 to 100 
                      Option B:     You get L18.00 for numbers 1 to 19 
Probability Valuation Task (PV) 
Set the missing probability so that the two options are equally attractive: 
                      Option A:     You get L10.00 for numbers 1 to ??? 
                      Option B:     You get L18.00 for numbers 1 to 19 
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Both MV and PV groups perform the Choice task in a first step. The MV group 
then responds to the Money Valuation Task and the PV group, to the Probability 
Valuation Task. The most frequent preference reversals are the SPR (33.6%) for 
the MV group and the CPR (21.7%) for the PV group. For the MV group the 
proportion (3.3%) of CPR is negligible but for the PV group the proportion (19.5%) 
of SPR is close to that of CPR. 
 
The first important result is the existence of standard preference reversals for the 
subjects who answer the MV task. This result rules out a large class of models 
including the expected utility model and the prospect theory model. There are, 
however, three psychological hypotheses capable of explaining this result: the 
prominence hypothesis (Tversky et al., 1988), the task goal hypothesis (Fisher et 
al., 1999), and the scale compatibility hypothesis (Tversky et al., 1988). 
 
As to those performing the PV task, a surprising result is the observation of counter 
preference reversals. This result rules out the prominence hypothesis and the task 
goal hypothesis, leaving only the scale compatibility hypothesis as a possible 
explanation. However, the standard preference reversal is also observed among the 
PV group, and, as pointed out by CMS, this last result cannot be explained by the 
scale compatibility hypothesis. So there is no model in the literature that can 
account for all three test results. We now propose a single model that can capture 
all these results. 
 
Qualitative judgment of lotteries 
 
The model extends Alarie and Dionne (2004) and takes into account explicitly the 
qualities associated with the set of probabilities pi ∈ P and the set of monetary 
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amounts xi ∈ X in order to obtain optimal processes and lottery evaluation. More 
specifically, as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we assume that probabilities 
have the surety (S) and risk (R) qualities. Prelec (1998) has proposed a w(pi) 
function that takes into account the qualitative difference between impossibility (I) 
and risk (R). So we define a partition of the set of probabilities P as {S,R,I}:  S = 
{1}, R = {pi / pi ∈ ]0,1[} and I = {0}. Alarie and Dionne (2004) add to the literature 
two new qualities (H and L) for probabilities that indicate whether a lottery has 
high chances of winning or not. In the partition {H,L} of P, the elements of H have 
the high quality and those of L have the low quality: L = { pi / pi ∈ [0, p*[} and H 
={pi / pi ∈ [p*,1]}. A value of p* — the fixed point of the inverse S-shape 
probability weighting function — which is larger than .3 but smaller than .5 is 
observed in many tests (see Prelec, 1998, for a discussion). 
 
In the evaluation function, the model takes into account the qualities by using a 
parameter α ∈]0,∝[. The parameter α can multiply either lottery A or lottery B but 
one lottery must be selected. When α is equal to one the model is equivalent to the 
expected utility one with risk neutrality. The judgment functions J(pA,xA,pB,xB) for 
the comparison of two lotteries where pA and pB belong to ]0,1[ are either: 
 
 αHL pAxA – pBxB   if pA ∈ H and pB ∈ L (1) 
or 
 αHH pAxA – pBxB   if pA,pB ∈ H, pA > pB. (2) 
 
We observe in (1) that the higher probability pA is multiplied by the parameter αHL 
since pA ∈ H and pB ∈ L while in (2) α = αHH since pA ∈ H and pB ∈ H and pA > pB. 
It should be noted that αHL > 1and αHH > 1 come from tests results in Tversky et al. 
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1990) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Indeed the lottery with the highest 
probability is selected. 
 
(1) and (2) are used for the choice tasks and the PV task. For the MV task where pB 
= 1 (pricing), there exist two judgments: one when pA ∈ L and the other when pA ∈ 
H: 
 
 αSR pAxA – pBxB  if pA ∈ H; (3) 
 
 αIRαSR pAxA – pBxB  if pA ∈ L. (4) 
 
It should be noted that αSR < 1and αIR > 1 come from the tests in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). 
 
 
Results 
 
The probabilities and the monetary amounts of the P-bet are noted pP and xP and 
those of the $-bet are p$ and x$. 
 
Choice task 
 
For the choice task, by using (1) when pP ∈ H and p$ ∈ L, we obtain: 
 
 αHL pPxP – p$x$ > 0 (5) 
 
because αHL > 1 for this type of choice which indicates that the quality H is 
preferred to the quality L. The P-bet is selected when the inequality (5) is 
respected. In the choice tasks that involve p$ ∈ H and pP ∈ H the decision maker 
uses αHH > 1 instead of αHL in (5) and the result remains the same. 
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MV task 
 
For the MV task, the prices CCE$ and CCEp are the Choice Certainty Equivalents 
that correspond respectively to the $-bet and the P-bet. By using (3) and (4), we 
obtain: 
 αSR pPxP = CCEP when pP ∈ H (6) 
and 
 αIRαSR p$x$  = CCE$ when p$ ∈ L. (7) 
 
So since αIR > 1 the lottery with the low probability that was not selected in the 
choice task now has a higher CCE$ than the one with the high probability, provided 
both have the same mathematical expectation. This explains the standard 
preference reversal. One can note that the MV task is a choice certainty equivalent. 
Had we used a judged certainty equivalent, the evaluation of the second lottery 
would have been αIR p$x$ and the number of reversals would have been larger 
(Tversky et al., 1990). 
 
Since p* ∈].3,.5[ it could happen that both probabilities .5 and .94 would belong to 
H for some tests (like Test 3 in CMS, 2004). So both lotteries are priced in the 
same way and we now have αSR pPxP = CCEP and αSR p$x$ = CCE$. So a constant 
αSR, as in Alarie and Dionne (2004), is not sufficient to explain this test and a more 
refined model is needed. One avenue is to use non-constant parameters αIR and αSR. 
For example, the distortion of the probabilities is larger near the points p=0 and 
p=1 for the Inverse S-shape probability function discussed in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) and in Prelec (1998). An interesting way to introduce non-
constant α parameters is to consider that, when judged with boundary 1, the higher 
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the probabilities in H the smaller the αSR< 1 parameter. Similarly, the lower the 
probabilities in L the larger the αIR> 1 parameter, when judged with boundary 0. 
So, for the pricing of lotteries, we obtain a parameter such as αSR(pH,1) when the 
probability belongs to H and a parameter such as αIR(pL,0) when the probability 
belongs to L. When both ∂αSR(pH,1)/∂pH and ∂αIR(pL,0)/∂pL are negative, the SPR 
can exist for the lotteries where both pP and p$ belong to H. For example αSR(.94,1) 
< αSR(.5,1) and then CCEP < CCE$. In conclusion, use of the non-constant 
parameters αSR and αIR explains the occurrence of the SPRs for the MV group. 
Non-constant parameters α do not change the conclusion for the cases where one 
probability is in H and the other is in L. 
 
PV task 
 
Based on the pricing of lotteries where test results show an Inverse S-shape curve 
and on the previous discussion, it is clear that the parameters αSR and αIR cannot be 
constant. So we could expect that the other parameters — αHH, αLL and αHL — not 
to be constant either. We now show that the tests in CMS confirm this hypothesis. 
 
For the PV task the monetary amount used in the CMS study is $10.00 and the 
decision maker must select a probability equivalent PE$ for the $-bet and PEp for 
the p-bet. This leads by using (2) for the $-lotteries to:  
 
 PE$ = p$x$/10αHH(p$,PE$). (8) 
 
For the P-lottery we have: 
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 PEP = αHH(pP,PEP)pPxP/10. (9) 
 
One notes that for some tests we must use αHL depending on the p* ∈ ].3,.5[ we 
observed. The comparison of lotteries (equation (10) below) and the difference 
(PEP-PE$) between the two probability equivalents (equation (11) below) are for the 
PV group:  
 
 αHH(pP,p$)pPxP – p$x$  (10) 
 
 [αHH(pP,PEP)pPxP – p$x$/αHH(p$,PE$)]/10. (11) 
 
If the parameters are constant the model allows CPR. However, for the PV group, 
we also observe standard preference reversal which, in our model, calls for the use 
of an α parameter as a function of the probabilities. A necessary condition to obtain 
a SPR is:  
 αHH(pP,p$)  > αHH(pP,PEP)αHH(p$,PE$). (12) 
 
Even though the CPR seems more likely to occur, the inequality (12) is quite 
possible. For most tests we have pP > PEP > p$ and pP > PE$ > p$ and the difference 
between the probabilities to the left of (12) is larger than the ones to the right of 
(12). The tests in CMS seem to indicate that the parameter α must vary according 
to these differences in probabilities. So the subjects can exhibit CPR or SPR 
depending on their parameter α. 
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Conclusion 
 
The model presented explains the occurrence of standard preference reversal for the 
MV group. For the PV group it explains the higher number of counter reversals and 
the presence of the standard reversals. These tests (PVs, MVs and the direct 
comparisons) confirm the need for non-constant parameters α. Furthermore they 
give some clues as to how these parameters vary. 
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